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The purpose of this study aims to identify the relationship between audit quality and board 
characteristics and firm performance. Past studies regarding the impact of characteristics 
of audit quality and board characteristics on firm performance are more focus on the 
mandatory obligations which are particularly need to make disclosure as declared by 
listing standards of Bursa Malaysia. The target population selected for this research is the 
listed companies in Malaysia. Secondary data of this study will be collected from annual 
reports published on Bursa Malaysia. The data collected is subsequently analyzed by 
adopting correlation and multiple regression analysis. Pearson Correlation Analysis and 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis are used to analysis the collected data. With the 
application of agency theory, this study provides additional knowledge to future 
academicians and researchers that wish to study in this area. Besides, the results of this 
study contribute to the companies and its management in decision making. Nevertheless, 
the audit quality and board characteristics that influence the firm performance most 
efficiently are identified. Therefore, the structure of audit quality in listed companies is 
able to be enhanced and lead to a higher level of firm performance. 















Tujuan kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengenal pasti hubungan antara kualiti audit dan ciri-
ciri lembaga dan prestasi firma. Kajian terdahulu mengenai kesan ciri-ciri kualiti audit dan 
ciri-ciri lembaga pada prestasi firma adalah lebih tertumpu kepada kewajipan mandatori 
yang khususnya perlu dibuat pendedahan seperti yang diisytiharkan oleh penyenaraian 
piawaian Bursa Malaysia. Populasi sasaran yang dipilih untuk penyelidikan ini adalah 
syarikat tersenarai di Malaysia. Data sekunder kajian ini akan diambil dari laporan 
tahunan yang diterbitkan di Bursa Malaysia. Data yang dikumpul kemudiannya dianalisis 
dengan menggunakan korelasi dan analisis regresi berganda. Analisis Korelasi Pearson 
dan Analisis Regresi Berganda Berganda digunakan untuk menganalisis data yang 
dikumpulkan. Dengan penerapan teori agensi, kajian ini memberikan pengetahuan 
tambahan kepada ahli akademik dan penyelidik masa depan yang ingin belajar di kawasan 
ini. Selain itu, hasil kajian ini menyumbang kepada syarikat dan pengurusannya dalam 
membuat keputusan. Walau bagaimanapun, kualiti audit dan ciri-ciri lembaga yang 
mempengaruhi prestasi firma yang paling cekap dikenalpasti. Oleh itu, struktur kualiti 
audit dalam syarikat tersenarai dapat ditingkatkan dan membawa kepada prestasi firma 
yang lebih tinggi. 
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Most companies are seeking to improve their performance in any way possible. The 
winning card can be held by those who endeavour to innovate, to obtain and sustain 
performance. Thus, competing in a continuously changing environment is very necessary 
to comprehend and monitor performance (Al-Matari, Abdullah & Faudziah, 2014). 
Therefore, assessing the determinants related to performance of organizations has always 
been of interest to management teams and researchers. In this study, the determinants of 
firm performance being assessed is board characteristics and audit quality. As to date, 
multiple studies have been done regarding the function of board characteristics and audit 
quality towards firm performance (Elewa & Rasha, 2019; Kramaric, Aleksic & Pejic-
Bach, 2018; Athalia & Sidharta, 2016; Mawih & Zaroug, 2015; Shehu & Musa, 2014; 
Ebrahim et al., 2014). Hence, the research meant to investigate the dynamic correlation 
between audit quality and board characteristics as well as its impacts on overall firm 
performance. 
 
This chapter discusses the introductory aspects of the chapter comprises of background of 
research, statement of problem, objectives and research questions while also covers scope 
and limitations in this study. Discussion also includes significance of research, hypothesis 
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and conceptual and operational of terms related in this study. Finally, the summary will 
conclude the first chapter. 
 
1.2 Background of Research 
These days, companies’ performance is the primary indicators of overall profit-loss 
experienced in a given period. Stakeholders such as investors surround the globe has paid 
more attention to the wellbeing of a company measured by its financial conditions. With 
technological advancement going around, business environment has become more 
competitive and companies has put in extra efforts just to make sure that survive in the 
market which includes restructuring of corporate governance and budget provisions in 
order to grow and maintain its position. Moreover, company with the highest performance 
have more advantage in terms of attracting potential investors and talented individuals as 
workers.  
 
In this regard, management plays a crucial role in determining the overall performance 
because they are the ones managing the company and is responsible in ensuring the 
wellbeing of the company financial position. Further, company management are 
responsible in overseeing business expansion through provisions of new structures and 
regulations in place of its out-of-date current business operations and conduct. In general, 
companies’ performance was determined by internal and external factor such as Return 
on Equity (ROE). The performance of a company was measured through a process of 
evaluating operational effectiveness and also efficiency (Al-Matri et al., 2014). As per 
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Taouab and Issor (2019) study, performance measurement is a process whereby a set of 
companies’ trait and abilities were evaluated to determine its relevancy in business setting. 
 
Performance measurement is an important aspect in management of business. Chen (2017) 
argue, performance assumes a critical role in the company as it determines the company’s 
overall condition. Yang, Muhammad and Muhammad (2018) conclude with Chen (2017) 
and added, management is the central focus in performance measurement as it monitors 
and evaluate the performance of a company while also responsible in aligning 
performance with company’s corporate objectives and strategies. Samiloglu, Oztop and 
Kahraman (2017) note that a good performance measurement report indicates healthy 
growth and secure shareholders interest which is to make profit in the long term. 
Accordingly, financial report frequently seen as the indicator of company’s performance 
where it was note that quality financial reporting will bring about better corporate image.  
 
Management is responsible in making sure that report is done in good quality and does 
not contain any bias or inconsolable mistake such as data faking. Hence, company strive 
towards ensuring effective management through the conduct of good performance 
measurement. Performance measurement is an outcome-based process and is crucial for 
any companies in with the goals of improving. Ndemezo and Kavitana (2017) argue that 
performance measurement was used to help company recognize which stages in the 
operation process posed significant effect to the performance. Success of a firm is 
therefore being interrelated with how the company perform in a given time. In this case, 
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corporate governance plays significant role in maintaining performance of a firm. The 
functions of corporate governance are that it served as system which directs and control 
how the company behave.  
 
According to Azhar and Razak (2017), corporate governance refers to an embodiment of 
both public and private institutions which comprises of specific set of rules and regulations 
that is used to govern business conduct. The elements of corporate governance include 
sound relationship amongst stakeholders and corporate executives. While Dzingai and 
Fakova (2017) establish that corporate governance is a process whereby company 
activities were handled and governed in a good faith so as to safeguard long term profit 
and value of shareholder as well as stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, a good system of 
corporate governance strives for both performance and responsibility of the company 
(Quang, Kwang & Yu Yi, 2014). Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) view corporate 
governance as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors (shareholders) protect 
themselves from inside investors (managers).  
 
The structure of an effective corporate governance outlines the responsibilities of each 
unit in the company encompasses board members, stakeholders and shareholders while at 
the same time apply a set of rules in determining the decision made by the management. 
This helps in setting a goal and direction as well as important in monitoring and evaluation 
process. As a central functional institution in the internal governance of the company, the 
presence of the board of directors and board of commissioners are important because of 
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their role in giving strategic direction (board of directors) and providing the key 
monitoring function (board of commissioners) in dealing with the agency problems of the 
company (Hidayat & Utama, 2016). 
 
According to Selvam, Gavatthri & Vasanth  (2016), a good corporate governance helps 
the company to appeal investors to inject funds into the operation which in turn enable 
company to produce higher productivity and subsequently resulting in a higher 
performance level. To put it differently, company will experience tremendous growth and 
achievements if it practices good corporate governance routine as it will help the company 
to sort out challenges faced and focus on how to grow better. Corporate governance is the 
broad term describes the processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions that directs the 
organizations and corporations in the way they act, administer and control their operations 
(Mohan & Chandramohan, 2018; Pang & Nik Intan, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, corporate governance concerns with establishing a good report amongst 
board company stakeholders which includes shareholders and also not to mention, the 
backbone of the company; board members. On a theoretical perspective, corporate 
governance work as an intermediate to resolve any issue related to principal and agent 
relationship. Shahrudin, Michael and Tan (2019) maintains that an effective corporate 
governance work as a mediator to an environment where investment sourcing helps in 
attracting fund and consequently boost competitiveness and promote market which are 
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efficiency-oriented. In essence, it was proven that the presence of effective corporate 
governance as the main ingredient in good business performance.  
  
1.3 Problem Statement 
The financial scandals such as the Enron disaster and WorldCom in 2002 resulted in the 
further need of corporate governance. Each of these monumental activities led to the loss 
of self-assurance of manageable buyers in the accounting approaches (Allen, Imbierowicz 
& Rauch, 2012). Another case took place in the US Sunbeam Company incident (2001) 
where the stakeholder member of its company indulged in illegal actions with other party 
which were indicted through capital punishment and the results is loss of confidence 
among investors (Erkens, Hung & Matos, 2012).  
 
Also, in another separate case, the crisis in Middle Eastern UAE in 2008 has outlines a 
concrete reasons as to why corporate governance is important in business process.  
 
Agency Theory is often associated with corporate governance. Agency theory is the 
relationship between the shareholder (principal) and the manager (agent), where the agent 
has been assigned to perform the service on behalf of the principal (Kultys, 2016). This 
means that the principal will empower and issue capital to finance the activities of the 
company by appointing agents to represent them in administering and managing the 
company with the aim of profit. Separation between these principals and agents will create 
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conflicts in which it will create imbalance of information (information asymmetry) 
between principals and agents (SMustapha, 2017). Here, issues arise in which agency 
theory, separation between principals and agents will create conflicts where agents tend 
to maximize their personal wealth and not to maximize the wealth of principals. 
 
As investor, government and regulators considered firm performance is one of the main 
criteria in an evaluation process in deciding for investing. Therefore, mostly firms use 
some characteristic such as the influence of the board characteristics and audit quality in 
reducing the agency problems and focusing on enhancing performance up to the optimum 
level. Corporate governance is of paramount importance in the current economic context 
(Fulop, 2014). Therefore, it is important to determine the origin of the term and to note its 
essential features. During the credit crisis, the lack of corporate governance (Al-Malkawi, 
2014) as well as audit quality (Salehi, 2009) are the main causes of many corporate 
scandals across the world.  
 
The problem indicates that, in terms of corporate governance, Malaysian companies are 
less interested by the responsible parties. Hence, the corporate governance mechanisms 
(board of directors, audit committees and audit quality) are expected to assist in reducing 
agency costs and costs, thereby enhancing the performance of the company. The trade and 
service sector companies is selected as a sample in this study is because it contributes to 
Malaysian economy and growth. In this study, trade and services sector is selected as a 
sample to examine the relationship and effect between the internal and external corporate 
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governance mechanisms with the company's performance. Previously, most corporate 
governance research studies only focused on the effectiveness of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms in resolving conflicts between shareholders and managing 
agencies.  
 
Based on statement by Tipuri and Podrug (2010), theory of agency problem by which 
agent (manager and/or employee) seeks to maximize personal goals and achieve economic 
objectives. As the companies with the large number employees managing capitals in the 
best interest of shareholders. (Brigham and Houston, 2007) stating several measures that 
can motivate managers to act in shareholders’ best interest ae the managerial 
compensation, direct intervention by shareholders, firing and threat of takeover. (Lasher, 
2008) also state that the effective management of the agency problem includes monitoring 
of the agent’s work. This research can conclude that internal corporate governance 
mechanism trying to keep up the firm’s performance. However, it is increasingly 
recognized that contractual relationships with an organization with various entities within 
the external environment, such as customers, suppliers, accountants, lawyers, overseas 
subsidiaries and network partners, may also experience the same problem that is related 
with the inequalities of information and behavior of selfish parties. 
 
Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012, surely enhance the roles and 
responsibilities of the board, strengthen the number of independent director in the board, 
examine director independences, separation of chairman and CEO position, improves the 
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company management framework and internal controls system, improves the standard of 
company financial reporting standard, and to have the better relationship between 
company and shareholders. Moreover, all directors should receive regular training, 
particularly on relevant new laws, regulations, and changing commercial risks from time 
to time. Therefore, this study aims to examine the relationships between board 
characteristics and audit quality and its impact towards company performance. 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
The general objective of this research is to examine the relationship between board 
characteristics and audit quality and its impact on firm performance. This research uses 
four corporate governance mechanisms which is board size, CEO duality, board 
ownership and audit quality. Detailed objectives as below; 
i. To investigate the relationship between board characteristics with firm performance. 
ii. To examine the relationship between audit quality with performance of firm. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
i. How is board characteristics related with firm performance? 





1.6 Scope and Limitations 
The researchers faced a few challenges amid the course of this study. To begin with, the 
accuracy of the information is completely subordinate on the accessibility of corporate 
administration information and firm execution. The information collected as it were based 
on factors displayed in this consider. In expansion, outside and inside components such as 
information inaccessibility can too influence the result of the think about. This consider is 
conducted as it were in Malaysia with tests of companies in exchange and benefit 
segments which cannot speak to the populace as an entirety. The study is limited to the 
performances analysis from 77 recorded firms on Bursa Malaysia Stock Trade within 5 
years period between the year of 2014 to 2018 that exclude banks, financial companies, 
insurance firms and investment funds. 
 
1.7 Significance of Research 
This study can be used as a feedback to the audit process, especially to improve audit 
quality among companies in service sectors. There are two interests in this study divided 
into theoretical and practical importance, as follows: 
 
1.7.1 Theory 
Theoretically, the outcome of this study is expected to enhance the understanding on 
corporate governance and firm performance and supporting evidence to the existing 
research findings. In addition, the results of this study also provide awareness of the 
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importance of good corporate governance towards enhancing to direct, organize, and 
control the firm’s performances, as the corporate governance is a system designated to 
professionally direct the company based on good corporate governance principles. 
 
1.7.2 Practical 
Practically, the results of this study are intended as useful feedback companies, board of 
directors and stakeholders. For company management, this research study is expanded to 
be used as a reference in designing a better corporate governance strategy. Company are 
expected to improve their corporate governance practice to enhance firms’ performance. 
The findings of this study are also expected to motivate stakeholders to learn about best 
practice in corporate governance such as demonstrating good citizenship through 
environmental awareness, ethical behaviour, and sound corporate governance practices. 
Hence, a transparent set of rules and controls created which shareholders, directors, and 
officer have aligned incentives. 
 
1.8      Summary 
The chapter discusses the background, problem statement, research objectives and 
analysis, scope and limitations, research significance and also definition of terms related 
to the topic under study. The next chapter will explain about the related studies on the 








This chapter will explain in details the theoretical framework underlying this study. This 
chapter also present the reviews of previous research on independent and dependent 
variables involved which are firm performance, board characteristics and audit quality. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
The foundation of agency theory that has evolved to date stems from a study entitled 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. This 
research was conducted by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. However, this research broadly 
does not only discuss the agency relationship. This research integrates elements of agency 
theory, ownership rights theory and financial theory to develop the theory of corporate 
ownership structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency relationships as contracts 
in which one or more people (principal) involve another person (agent) to perform several 





As a result of this agency relationship, the emergence of agency problems in this case the 
agency will try to maximize its own interests while ignoring the interests of the principal 
even though the main goal of a company is to maximize the welfare of the owners of 
capital. Therefore, we need a form of control to control the actions of the agent. Because 
the relationship between shareholders and company managers fits the definition of a pure 
agency relationship, it should not be surprising to know that the problems associated with 
"separation of ownership and control" in modern companies with diffuse ownership are 
closely related to general agency issues (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that there are two aspects of the problem found in agency 
problems, namely: 
1) Adverse Selection, which refers to conditions where the principal cannot ascertain 
whether the agent's capabilities are in accordance with his abilities. 
2) Moral Hazard, which refers to the actions of agents who do not comply with what 
was agreed with the principal. This can occur because of the separation between 
ownership and control that surrounds most business organizations. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), agent-principal problem was governed by a system 
of decision making which splits the corporate conduct while at the same time control 
evaluation and monitoring process to promote good decision making in an institution. As 




1) Hierarchy in decision making which reflects how agents in the low level provide 
input and passed it on to those in higher level for approval and subsequently, monitoring 
process. 
2) The approval was made by the board members such as the director in order to 
make sure that the decision taken has its reliability. 
3) An incentive structure that encourages joint monitoring among decision agents. 
The cost of such a mechanism to separate decision management from decision control is 
part of the price that public companies pay for the benefit of an unlimited claim of ordinary 
shares. 
 
According to Messier et al. (2017), the relationship between owners and managers 
generally creates information asymmetry between the two parties. Information asymmetry 
means that managers generally have more information about the financial position and the 
actual operating results of the entity rather than the owner. Then, Messier et al. (2017) 
explains that because there are different goals, there is a conflict of interest that naturally 
arises between managers and owners. 
If both parties try to maximize personal interests, the manager is believed to not frequently 
arrive in a decision that satisfy the company owner. Of these two problems, Messier et al. 
(2017) explain that the manager may agree to certain types of monitoring provisions in 
his work contract, giving the owner certainty that he will not abuse resources. 
The certainty referred to above is through an audit. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
principals can control agent behaviour through a provision of adequate monitoring and 
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evaluation process which were specifically made to control further unlawful activities 
amongst agents. The first method is through reward program, where compensation aims 
to motivate managers so that managers is motivated to act in company’s best interest and 
enhance performance and he or she can obtain incentives in the form of additional income 
even though basically managers can make deviations known as bonus plan hypotheses 
that stated by Watts and Zimmerman (1986). However, when the manager is unable to 
reach the targets that were previously set, then the manager will receive a penalty or 
sanction. 
 
Here, reward and punishment applies to managers. Second, monitoring means that there 
is principal control over the agent. The audit previously mentioned is a form of 
monitoring. In addition to auditing, the most common form of monitoring currently aimed 
at reducing agency conflict is corporate governance, which will be explained in a separate 
section. There are several alternatives to reduce agency cost quoted from Susilawati 
(2007), namely: 
 
(1) By expanding the company's share possession by the manager, so that the chief 
feels straightforwardly the benefits of the choices taken and on the off chance that there 
are misfortunes that emerge as a result of off-base choice making. This possession will 
adjust the manager's boundary with interested parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, 
manager proprietorship offers is a motivating force for supervisors to progress company 
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execution and supervisors will utilize obligation ideally, subsequently minimizing agency 
costs. 
 
(2) Increase in pay-out ratio (dividend) to make sure that there was adequate level of 
cash flow available and if not, managers are urged to attain external sources of funding to 
boost company productivity and to survive the daily operation (Crutchley et al., 1989). 
 
(3) By increasing funding from debt. Increasing debt will reduce the amount of 
struggle amongst investors and executives. Further, debt will also reduce the excess cash 
flow in the company, thus decreasing or limiting the likelihood of manager misuse the 
funds for non-beneficial activities (waste) (Susilawati, 2007). 
The ownership of institutional investors comprises of banking and investment firms as 
well as ownership through public acquisition will encourage more optimal oversight of 
manager performance. These efforts were made to minimize any rising struggles in the 
company relations. Keep in mind, the main essence that causes agency problems is due to 
the egoism of each individual, in this case principals and agents. 
 
2.3 Boards Characteristic 
Based on (Garcia-Sanchez, 2009) the board is seen as the backbone of corporate 
governance as their main responsibility is to provide effective governance over the 
company affairs. It is crucial for a listed company to have an effective board with the 
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capabilities and focusing on aligning the management’s interests and the shareholders’ 
interests as the board bears overall accountability for the performance of the company. A 
suitable board characteristic is necessary to produce an effective board while an effective 
board on the other hand would likely produce positive performance by the company. 
Board independence and size are among structural measures to determine board 
effectiveness in its monitoring function (John and Senbet, 1998) while changes in the 
board characteristics for example appointment of independent directors, creation of board 
committees and separation of the roles of chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman 
contribute to board effectiveness and have been long advocated by corporate governance 
codes and experts (Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). 
 
2.3.1 Board Sizes 
Total number of directors in a company refers to board size of a firm stated (Abdullah, 
2004). According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), both scholars argued 
that larger boards tend to increase the coordination and lead to decision making problems. 
Hence they suggested that smaller boards are more effectively managed for the firms. 
Number of directors should be sufficient to ensure that the board can effectively discharge 
its roles and responsibilities. At the same time, the size must be contained so that the board 
does not become too large, which could then compromise board dynamics and the 





2.3.2 Board Ownership 
Hu, Tam and Tan (2010) identified that corporate governances issue increasing from 
concentrated board ownership in emerging economies have received growing attention. 
They employed structural equation modelling to evaluate the independent and 
interdependent effects of corporate governance mechanism consists role of the board of 
director, supervisory boards, role duality and board size. Their study covering 304 
publicly listed companies over 3 year data set from 2003 until 2005. Results indicate that 
board ownership concentration has the most significant governance effect and negative 
impact on firm performance. Meanwhile, role of board directors, role duality and 
supervisory boards have a positive relationship with performance and others mechanism 
didn’t show any impact since not significant.  
 
2.3.3 CEO Duality 
CEO duality refers to a board leadership structure in which the chief executive officer 
(CEO) is also the chairman of the board (Bozec, 2005). Ideally, from agency theory 
perspective, Chairman segregates some authority to the CEO rather than solely company 
owner held the office. This can increase the accuracy balance of accounting, at the same 
time increase the firm performance (Valenti et al., 2011). However, some studies report 
no significant relationship (Dalton et al., 1998) while other studies suggest a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and profitability (Ezzamel and Watson, 1993). On the 
other hand, according to (Norazian, 2012) CEO duality was found to have a significant 
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effect on firm performance using Return on Asset (ROA) and financial strength 
(shareholder’s right ratio). 
 
2.4 Audit Quality 
Concurring to Zheng (2018), review quality of a company with adequate independence 
and competence which the evaluator ought to be able to discover the fabric misstatements 
and report them hence completing the review with tall quality. Thus, review quality can 
be seen through the reviews agreement with examining benchmarks. Also, Pitkanen 
(2016) characterizes review quality to be the market-assessed joint likelihood of finding a 
blunder within the monetary articulations and announcing it to the partners. In this 
consider, review quality will be surveyed in respects to its connection with board 
characteristics. Examining is one of the control components is utilized by companies to 
address office issues (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Watts & Zimmerman 1986). 
 
Through auditing, the manipulation of accounting information can be reduced. Auditors 
are more sensitive to earnings management and make every effort to prevent manipulation 
of earnings (Hirst 1994). However, the auditing value of each firm varies depending on 
the quality of the audit firm. Audit quality is defined as the probability that the auditor 
detects fraud and fraud in the client's accounting system and reports the fraud (DeAngelo 
1981). In previous studies, large audit firms (Big 8, Big 6 or Big 5) were frequently used 
as proxies of audit quality (DeAngelo 1981; Davidson & Neu 1993; Becker, Defonel, 
Jiambalvo and Subvomanyam 1998; Francis, and Sparks 1999; Gul et al 2001). Non-Big 
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6 firm customers report higher selections than Big 6 audit firm customer selections on 
average 1.5% and 2.15% of total assets (Becker et al. 1998). This finding was supported 
by Francis et al. (1999) found that Big 6 audit firm customers had lower selectable accruals 
compared to non-Big 6 audit firm subscribers, although Big 6 audit firms had larger 
accruals. 
 
2.4.1 Audit Tenure  
Audit Tenure is the period of engagement time that exists between KAP with the same 
audited (Hartadi, 2009, Nuratama, 2011). The issue of audit tenure is usually associated 
with its effect on auditor independence Research conducted by Ghosh and Moon (2003 in 
Kusharyanti, 2003) resulted in findings that audit quality increases with the length of audit 
tenure. This is contrary to the results of a research conducted by Indah (2010) which states 
that the longer the auditor relationship with clients, could decrease the level of audit 
quality, because the longer the auditor relating to client led the auditor to be bias and 
impaired the independency.  
  
2.5 Corporate Governance 
According to Nuryaman (2008), corporate governance encompasses the stages or 
relationships to produce efficiency in economic achievement of a firm, and it dictates how 
a company behave or arrive in a decision satisfying the needs and interests of all parties. 
The concept derived from theory related to agency which serves as company measures to 
increase confidence level in investors. In sum, corporate governance is to guarantee 
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investors of their profit return (Herawaty, 2008). Also, it was a concept proposed for the 
sake of improving company performance through supervision and monitoring of 
management performance and ensuring management accountability to stakeholders by 
basing it on a regulatory framework (Nasution, 2007). 
 
According to the Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI, 2004), corporate 
governance is a set of regulations that establish the relationship between shareholders, 
managers (managers) of the company, creditors, government, employees and other 
internal and external stakeholders relating to rights and their obligations, or in other words 
a system that regulates and controls the company. Whereas the World Bank defines good 
corporate governance as a collection of laws, regulations and rules that must be met, which 
can encourage the performance of company resources to function efficiently to produce 
long-term sustainable economic value for shareholders and the public around as a whole 
(Effendyy, 2009). Corporate governance is a system that regulates and control companies 
which includes providing and improving company value to parties-of-interest (Siallagan, 
2006).  
 
2.5.1 Corporate Governance and Agency Theory 
In 1992, a report known as the Cadbury report was published and contained a number of 
recommendations to improve corporate governance practices. This report forms the basis 
for the formation of corporate governance practices. The many fraud scandals that 
occurred in the 1990s and involving large companies such as Enron, Worldcom 
34 
 
undermined the trust of capital owners. Corporate governance then becomes one way to 
restore the trust of capital owners. Corporate governance is a system which govern and 
control the company. The top executives and company management as a whole is 
exclusively accountable to the performance of the company and the provision of a good 
corporate governance practice. Shareholders in the management process function to select 
and hire auditors (internally or externally) based on the corporate governance principles 
of clean company conduct. 
 
The responsibilities of the board of directors include setting the company's strategic goals, 
providing leadership to implement them, overseeing business management and reporting 
to shareholders on their stewardship. The actions of the board are subject to the laws, 
regulations and shareholders at a general meeting. According to Rankin et al. (2012), 
corporate governance direct and control company’s practice so that it adheres to a set of 
rules and abstain from misconduct. OECD describes corporate governance a process-
procedures system that govern the company wellbeing. It outlines the job scope and 
function of each company entities such as stakeholders (managers, directors) and 
shareholders (investors – private or institution) and assist in helping these units in making 
sound decision. 
 
By doing this, it also provides a structure through which the company's goals are set, and 
how to achieve those goals and monitor performance. The Forum for Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) in Randy (2013) defines corporate governance as a set 
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of rules governing relationships between shareholders, management (managers) of 
companies, creditors, governments, employees, as well as other internal and external 
stakeholders related with their rights and obligations or in other words a system that 
regulates and controls the company. Corporate governance is very much interrelated with 
theory of agency issue. For example, the case of Enron company which depicts the 
disparity in knowledge possessed by both agent and principal. Enron Energy is one of 
America’s biggest energy, service and commodity based company which suffered a huge 
backlash stemming from conspiracy and fraud conducted by its Chief Executive.  
 
The company eventually bankrupt and the cause was known as window dressing situation 
where the company falsify data to appear that the company is doing good to attract 
investors. Thus, window dressing is similar to the act of inaccurately report the condition 
of the company to attract external funds when in fact, the company is in the brink of losses. 
Not only Enron Chief was responsible in the cover-up, but the auditor which were hired 
to provide a fair report of the company condition was also found guilty of fraud. The 
actions have caused Enron to collapse and shut its doors permanently. Theory of agency 
maintains that the principal (company management) and agents (auditors) should work 
towards creating a balanced environment where all the data and information shared were 
accurately depicted. 
 
Since the collapse of the Enron, the Sarbanes Oxley Law was published, which contained 
regulations regarding the transparency and disclosure of public companies in America. 
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Corporate governance then absolutely needs to be present in every company. The aim is 
to reduce behaviours that can harm the principal as explained in the agency theory. As 
explained above, corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that can regulate the 
relationships between many parties involved in the company. This corporate governance 
can then protect the interests of principals who are often harmed due to deviant agents. La 
Porta et al. (2000) describe corporate governance in general refer to a pre-determined 
instruments used by the stakeholders (investors) in order to safeguard their interests from 
being manipulated or misappropriated by company management which includes takeover. 
Takeovers is available in several types and the typical ones is that company management 
misappropriate company fund or profit for personal use.  
 
Another type of takeover is when the company management sold accumulated assets or 
output in which they have full control in but were bought using investors’ funds to external 
forces such as the competitors. The transfer and disposal of assets, although often legal, 
for the most part have the same effect as theft. In general, takeovers relate to the condition 
where company manage the operation in a way that it affect the profit in behalf of the 
investors. As such, company management is said to have used the fund for other purpose 
undesired by the investors and are motivated by greed. La Porta et al., (2000) reported, 
instead of giving back the profit to the rightful owner of the company, the management 
executives use that money for personal benefit and is committing fraud. Hence, corporate 
governance served as a mediator between investors and company management and to 
align the interest of both parties to achieve maximum profit. Hence, corporate governance 
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exists to further reduce and harmonize differences in interests between principals and 
agents, which often do not have the same view. 
  
This has been well explained by agency theory which assumes that every human being or 
person is interest maximize. The egoism of every human being plays an important role in 
this regard. Therefore, corporate governance can be one mechanism that reduces this 
agency problem. Corporate governance can monitor existing contracts between principals 
and agents. When a violation of a contract is found by the agent either, there will be 
sanctions imposed by the principal as the party that delegates authority to the agent. 
 
2.6 Relationship Between Board Characteristic and Firm’s Performances 
It cannot be denied that board size is the one of an important mechanism of effective 
corporate governance (Bonn, 2004). Despite considerable amount of effort in research on 
board size, there are still no exact answers among researchers. Based on previous studies, 
some researchers stated that there is positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance (Shukeri, 2012) and Lakhal (2005) found that there is a positive but a very 
weak between board size and firm performance. In addition, Chen (2006) also found that 
board size is positively related to firm’s earning per share (EPS) among listed companies 
in China while Shukeri (2012) also indicated that board size also positively influences 
firm’s return on assets (ROA). In another study by Sanda et al. (2003), small board size 
was found to be positively correlates with firm performance but this statement is opposed 
when it comes to a large board. On the other hand, some researchers argued that there has 
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negative relationship between these two variables (Mishra, 2001). Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) also argued that board size is not truly a demographic attitudes, thus it is unlikely 
to affect the board functioning. This statement is also supported by Holthauson and 
Larcker (1993) who are failed to relate board size with firm performance. Eisenberg 
(1998) also found negative correlation between board size and profitability when using 
sample of small and medium Finnish firms. The result is consistent with study on 
corporate governance of family firms in Norway state by (Mishra, 2001). 
 
2.7 Relationship Between Audit Quality and Firm’s Performances 
The demand for quality audit has also been motivated by the need to manage agency 
conflict. Information asymmetry between shareholder and manager creates a moral 
hazards problem. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) managers will pursue their 
self-interest at the expense of shareholders. Agency theory that predicts the agent and 
principals will recognize that it can be mutually beneficial and interest to reduce the moral 
hazard and will revising arrangement to align with their self-interest. Independent audit 
will provides a monitoring device designed to improve information about company 
performance and reduce information asymmetry. The greater the agency conflict between 
manager and shareholders, the greater agency cost, and the greater the demand for audits 
identified as high quality (Palmrose 1986; Francis and Wilson 1988; De Fond 1992; 
Creswell et al. 1995). Assuming that quality audit might reduce the agency cost where 
auditor provide an indicators about the credibility of financial statement information 
concluding lower monitoring cost could lead to better performance of corporation. 
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2.8 Previous Research 
According to Muchemwa et al., (2016), board size refers to the total number of directors 
on the board of each sample firm which is inclusive of the CEO and Chairman for each 
accounting year. Gunasekar (2014) note that the average board size is 9.2 members, and 
most boards range from 3 to 31 members. In this study, the size of board members for 
each company will be analyzed to see its relationship with audit quality and further, firm 
performance. As stated by Mohammadi, Basir and Loof (2015), CEO duality is when the 
same person holds both the CEO and board chairperson positions in a corporation. 
Goergen (2019) on the other hand refer CEO duality as one of the most contentious issues 
in the area of corporate governance where firms delegate the task of decision management 
to the CEO, and decision control to the board. In this study, company will be identifying 
if it involved in CEO duality type or not to give a further understanding on its relation 
with audit quality and subsequently, firm performance. 
 
According to Pang et al., (2016), board ownership refers to concentrated ownership leads 
to effective monitoring. This can be understood as ownership structure where the presence 
of dispersed ownership increases expectation of a positive relationship between measures 
of corporate governance and firm performance, other things being equal (Afshan, Chhetri 
& Pradhan, 2011). Thus, in this study, the type of company ownership will be analysed in 
its relation with audit quality and firm performance. Brickley et al. (1988) concluded that 
the board’s ownership is an encouragement for board members. This encouragement will 
help board members supervise management in a more efficient way. Consistent with this 
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view, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Raouf and Harun (2011), Chung and Pruit (1996) 
considered that boards’ ownership will improve company performance. Mehran (1995) 
presented empirical evidence that there is a positive correlation between board ownership 
and firm’s performance.  
 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter explains the theoretical framework underlying this study. The concept of 
corporate governance, empirical discussion on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm’s performance is also presented. The next chapter will discuss on the 
















This chapter will explain the method adopted by this research. This chapter will mention 
every component involved in conducting this research. Finally, this chapter provide a 
details explanation of the selected mode of analysis used and data collection method. 












Figure 3. 1:  
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3.3 Hypotheses Development 
Evidence from previous empirical studies from academic literature has sought to confirm 
the effect of corporate governance on a firm’s performance. A literature review from 
relevant academic studies has indicated the following characteristics applied to corporate 
governance such as: (i) Audit Tenure; (ii) Board Ownership; (iii) Board Sizes; and (iv) 
CEO Duality.  Each of these characteristics will be discussed in details and in turn below; 
3.3.1 Audit Tenure 
Audit Tenure is the number of period-years an audit firm, an auditor audits a client or the 
number of years a company employs the same auditor. Long audit tenure may increase 
the knowledge about the client’s internal operation but, the downside is that the auditor’s 
independence may get compromised (Islam, 2016; Feleke, 2017).  
 
 
 Figure 3.2: 
 A relationship between audit tenure and firm performance 
 Figure 3.2, illustrates the relationship between audit tenure and firm performance. 
Therefore the relationship between audit tenure and firm performance is hypothesized as 
follows. 
H1: There is a relationship between audit tenure with firm performance. 
 
 
Audit Tenure Firm Performance 
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 3.3.2 Board’s ownership 
Brickley et al. (1988) concluded that the board’s ownership is an encouragement for board 
members. This encouragement will help board members supervise management in a more 
efficient way. Consistent with this view, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Rouf and Harun 
(2011), Chung and Pruitt (1996) considered that, board’s ownership will improve firm’s 
performance. Mehran (1995) presented empirical evidence that there is a positive 




A relationship between board ownership and firm performance 
 
Figure 3.3, illustrates the relationship between board ownership and firm performance. 
Therefore the relationship between board ownership and firm performance is 
hypothesized as follows. 
H2: There is relationship between board ownership with firm performance 
 
3.3.3 Board Size 
In relation to a relationship between the size of a board and a firm’s performance, there 
are two distinct schools of thoughts. The first school of thought argues that a smaller board 
size will contribute more to the success of a firm (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; 
Yermack, 1996). However, the second school of thought considers that a large board size 
Board Ownership Firm Performance 
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will improve a firm’s performance (Klein, 1998; Rouf, 2011). These studies indicate that 
a large board will support and advise firm management more effectively because of a 
complex of business environment and an organizational culture (Klein, 1998). Moreover, 
a large board gather much more information. As a result, a large board size appears to be 
better for firm performance (Dalton, 1999). On the ground of this study, a research 




A relationship between board sizes and firm performance 
 
Figure 3.4, illustrates the relationship between board sizes and firm performance. 
Therefore the relationship between board sizes and firm performance is hypothesized as 
follows. 
H3: There is relationship between board sizes with firm performance 
 
3.3.4 Duality of the CEO: 
In Europe, 84 per cent of firms separate the roles of chair of a board and a CEO of a firm 
(Heidrick & Struggles, 2009). Accoring to a Hewa-Wellalage and Locke 2011 study, in 
Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan code of best practice on corporate governance emphasizes the 
balance of power within a firm to minimize any one individual’s influence to the decision 
making process. These rules provided recommendation that when there is a duality in a 
Board Sizes Firm Performance 
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firm, a number of independent directors on a board should be a majority to provide balance 
and an effective and efficient operation of a board. As a result, this study’s research 




A relationship between CEO Duality and firm performance 
 
Figure 3.5, illustrates the relationship between CEO Duality and firm performance. 
Therefore the relationship between CEO Duality and firm performance is hypothesized as 
follows. 
H4: There is relationship between CEO Duality with firm performance 
 
The study by Abdullaha et al., in 2014 however contradicted with this research. They 
found that independence of audit committee does not play any significant impact in 
reducing companies’ problem with efficiency and honesty in reporting financial data. 
Audit committee also was not involved with companies’ profit accumulation and process 
and if there is a function of audit committee being so independent is that it was fraud 
waiting to happen (Abdullaha et al., 2014). 
 
 
CEO Duality Firm Performance 
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3.4 Research Design 
This study was relying on quantitative design. Statistical analysis, table or graph was 
typically applied in this study. The evaluation and assessment of the firm performance 
was according to the data gathered from the company’s’ annual report. 
 
3.5 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
3.5.1 Independent Variable 
There are two independent variables in this study which is the board characteristic and 
audit quality. The board characteristics analysed in this study involved board size, board 
ownership and CEO duality. Meanwhile, for audit quality analysed in this study involved 
only audit tenure.  
 
3.5.2 Dependent Variable 
In this study, the performance of the firm is used as the dependent variable which is 
measured through a method called accounting and market based approach. This study will 
use Return on Asset (ROA) will be utilized to depict approach for accounting method. 
 
3.5.3 ROA 
Return on Assets is obtained by the company in connection with the overall resources or 
the average amount of assets. In other words, Return on Assets or often abbreviated as 
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ROA is a ratio that measures how efficient a company is in managing its assets to generate 
profits during a period. ROA is expressed as a percentage (%). 
 
3.5.4 Control Variables 
In order to analyses the impact of the board characteristics and audit quality on firm 
performance, we have employed several other explanatory variables that may affect the 
board size and firm performance relationship. These control variables are employed in 
accordance with the variables used in the existing literature.  
 
3.5.5 Firm Size  
It is measured as a natural logarithm of total sales (Boone et al., 2007). Different 
researchers reported an ambiguous relationship between the firm size and the firm 
performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
3.5.6 Firm Age 
Natural logarithm of the number of years between the observation year and the 






3.5.7 Measurement of Variables 
 
Table 3.1: 





Variables Definition Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
ROA Return on Asset (Earnings Before Tax and 
Interest)/Total Assets 
Independent Variables 
Board size Board members Number of inside and outside 
directors on the board 
Duality CEO Dual Coded “1” if Chairman also 
holds the position of CEO and 
“0” otherwise 
Ownership Board’s Ownership Ratio of shares held by director 
divided by total outstanding 
shares 
Audit Tenure Audit Tenure Number of years of for auditor. 
Control Variables 
Firm Size Firm size Natural logarithm of book value 
of total assets 




3.6 Statistical Analysis 
In this study, descriptive statistics was employed. Also, to measure the degree of linear 
dependency among variables, correlation test using Pearson correlation was used. The 
thesis took into account the panel data regression models which is random effect and fixed 
effect model which was selected using Hausman test. To analyse the effect of board 
characteristics and audit quality towards firm performance, a technique called Feasible 
Generalized Least Square (FGLS) regression was employed. This method was used to 
estimate unknown parameter in the linear regression model. 
 
3.7 Sample and Data 
3.7.1 Sample 
A sample was collected from 122 listed firms on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange for 
the period of 5 years from 2014 to 2018 inclusive. This sample did not include banks, 
financial companies, insurance firms and investment funds due to significant difference 
of the capital structures and operations’ requirements. It is noted that formats of annual 
reports and financial statements of these 122 listed firms are not similar. As such, missing 
data is unavoidable. As a result, listed firms missing any required data are excluded from 
the final sample of the study. The final sample only includes 77 listed firms with the total 






Data involved in this study was mainly from secondary sources. The main data panel was 
company annual financial report from year 2014 until 2018. The company selected was 
those listed in Bursa Saham Malaysia Stock Exchange. Data was analysed using Statistical 
Analysis Software (SAS) and Excel. 
 
3.8 Method of Analysis 
3.8.1 Multiple Linear Regression 
Multiple linear regression (MLR), also known simply as multiple regression, is a statistical 
technique that uses several explanatory variables to predict the outcome of a response 
variable. The goal of multiple linear regression (MLR) is to model the linear relationship 
between the explanatory (independent) variables and response (dependent) variable. In 
essence, multiple regression is the extension of ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression 
that involves more than one explanatory variable. Below is the formula of MLR. 




A simple linear regression is a function that allows an analyst or statistician to make 
predictions about one variable based on the information that is known about another 
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variable. Linear regression can only be used when one has two continuous variables which 
an independent variable and a dependent variable. The independent variable is the 
parameter that is used to calculate the dependent variable or outcome. A multiple 
regression model extends to several explanatory variables. The purpose of constructing of 
this model is to find out the impact of audit quality on firm performance using ROA and 
TQ as measures for firm performance. ROA measures firm profitability as proportion of 
net income to firm total assets, whereas TQ measures firm value as proportion of market 
capitalization of firm to firm total asset 
The model used to test the hypothesis is a follows: 
Y = a + bi Xi + bi X2 + bi X3 + bi X4 + e 
Description:  
Y = Firm Performance 
X1 = Audit Tenure 
X2 = Board Ownership 
X3 = Board Sizes 
X4 = CEO Duality 






3.9 Summary of the Chapter  
             The chapter begin with an introduction then describe all hypothesis development in this 
study.  Research design and framework is also mentioned before discussing the sample 
and measurement of variables. The data were collected are then analyzed and discussed 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings and results of the study. The data presented was 
processed using SAS software and the results reflect the importance of the assumptions 
projected in this study. Analysis will be presented using descriptive and inferential 
analysis. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis 
4.2.1 Demographic Data  
Table 4.1:  
Demographic Profile of 77 Listed Companies in Malaysia 
Sectors Frequency Percentage (%) 
Plantation 5 6.00 
Properties 10 13.00 
Industrial Products 9 12.00 
Construction 8 10.00 
Trading or Services 20 26.00 
Consumer Products 22 29.00 
Technology 3 4.00 




Figure 4.1:  
Summary of Respondents Demographic Profile 
 
Table 4.1 shows the information comes about appeared in term of recurrence and rate after 
the collected information being analysed. There are add up to seven (7) divisions for the 
77 investigate test sample companies taken an interest within the advertise counting items 
of plantation, properties, industrial product, construction, trading or services, consumer 
products and technology. According to Figure 4.1, the consumer product division has 
possessed the biggest rate of 29% compared to other businesses, taken after by two other 
segments which is trading or services with 26% and properties with 13%. 
 
The segments with the most reduced rate are the plantation with as it were 6% as well as 
the industrial product and construction segment has as it were shared by 12% and 10% 
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separately. As generally, among the seven divisions within the 77 list companies, there 
are three segments that shared less than 15% which are plantation (6%), industrial product 
(12%), construction (10%) and technology (4%). The divisions that in 6% is properties 
(10%). The trading or service (26%) and consumer product (29%) are the divisions that 
involved in between 20% to 30%. It is noted that formats of annual reports and financial 
statements of these 122 listed firms are not similar. As such, missing data is unavoidable. 
As a result, listed firms missing any required data are excluded from the final sample of 
the study.  
 
4.2.2 Constructs in Central Tendencies Measurements 
Table 4.2:  
Central Tendencies Measurements (CTM) for Independent and Dependent Variables 
N=77  













































This section presents the results of central tendencies measurements for independent and 
dependent variable. It was found that the performance of determined through the ROE 
rate. The data for dependent variable was recorded as 10.7498 with standard deviation of 
5.13862. Further, the lowest ROE rate was recorded in negative number (-11.39) whereas 
the highest ROE rate were a solid 20.84. As for mean data, 0.9538 mean were recorded 
for Audit Tenure (SD= 0.11508). The results indicate that audit committee in the sample 
companies were independent or at least possess some sort of autonomy which enable them 
to take up their own decision. Minimum value recorded were 0.67 and 1.00. In term of 
Board Ownership, 0.61800 was the mean while 0.05395 was the standard deviation. It can 
measure by ratio of shares held by total outstanding shares. The maximum and minimum 
value of Board Ownership was 1.00 and 0.30. For Board Size with a mean of 0.48690 and 
standard deviation of 0.50030. Meanwhile, the maximum and minimum value of Board 
Sizes was 2.00 and 0.40. It also can be measure by number of inside and outside directors 
on the board.  In relation to the CEO Duality, table 4.2 presented 0.16670 mean with a 
deviation of 0.18765. The minimum value of CEO Duality was 0.30 then the maximum 
value was 1.00.  
 
4.3 Scale of Measurement 
4.3.1 Test of Reliability 
The data collected in this study were based on companies’ financial reports which were 
retrieved from Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange website. Period of data gathering only 
took into account reports for the year 2014 until 2018. As per the findings of Romi (2013), 
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large companies are more susceptible to public perception because of its reputation. 
Hence, it will experience less external interception and have the ability to conduct its own 
decision. Being known and subjected to public perception, big companies have more 
tendency to provide an insightful information about their operation which includes 
financial reports, integration and related scheme (Sulaiman, Abdullah, & Fatima, 2014). 
Since reliability is about whether a set of data was fit to be used in a research context, the 
annual reports were considered reliable as it comes from companies’ own database and 
internal investigation.  
 
4.3.2 Normality Test 
In general, normality tests were used to show whether a set of data is distributed normally 
within a given population (Singh, & Masuku, 2014). Ghasemi and Zabediasl in their 2012 
study note that data dispersion often overlooked because it was subjected to external 
perception. Normality tests might be subjected to breach of privacy basically denote if a 
given variable can be used as a statistical measure. Hence, should a variable does not pass 
the test, it was referred as abnormality, caused by mainly outliers. According to Field 
(2009) and Elliot and Woodward (2007), the value of normality test should be based on 
the rate of less than 30 or 40 in order to make sure the data distribution validity. 
 
Normality tests normally showed in terms of histogram which require a larger sample size 
in order to picture and accurate value of normality. However, other forms of graphical 
representation can be used if it is fit. In terms of statistical significance, normality tests 
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are important in determining if a data is usable in the study. Therefore, normality tests 
were not applicable in this study because the data were taken from reputable sources.  
 
4.4 Inferential Analysis 
4.4.1 Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.3: 
Correlation between Variables 
  BCHAR AUDQ 
 ROE BCHAR1 BCHAR2 BCHAR3 AUDQ1 
             ROE 1     
             BCHAR1 0.02431 1    
             BCHAR2 0.06276 0.03213 1   
             BCHAR3 0.09332 0.11521 0.0140 1  
             AUDQ1 0.56145 0.06213 0.0700 0.0730 1 
 
Where,   N = 77   
ROE   = Return on Equity 
AUDQ  = Audit Quality  
BCHAR  = Board Characteristics 
BCHAR1  = Board Ownership 
BCHAR2  = Board Sizes 
BCHAR3  = CEO Duality 
AUDQ1  = Audit Tenure 
 
Inferential analysis involved in this study were the Pearson Correlation test. In this test, 
the value recorded was coefficient expressed as R value which was responsible in 
determining the significance between independent and dependent variable. This test also 
showcases whether one variable impact positively or negatively with another. The 
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outcome for correlation analysis in this study were shown in table above. Dependent 
variable is firm performance while independent variables were audit quality and board 
characteristics. ROE were used as statistical measure for firm performance which 
according to Garson (2006), work as an important tool to determine the issue 
multicollinearity.  
Hence, the correlation value for AUDQ1 with ROE recorded at 0.56145. As for BCHAR2 
and BCHAR3 with ROE, the significant value recorded at and 0.02431 and 0.09332 at 
90% confidence level. For BCHAR1 with ROE, the significant value recorded at 0.06276 
at 95% confidence level. In this sense, both BCHAR and AUDQ showcase a value of less 
than 1 which denote that multicollinearity does not applied. Hence, the correlation results 
are in line with Multiple Linear Regression assumptions which the basics of regression 
coefficient analysis. The results also show that there is some degree of significance 
between independent and dependent variable with firm performance.  
 
4.4.1.1 Audit Tenure 
In general, there the relationship between audit tenure and firm performance is significant. 
The value of R recorded in this study is between 0.41 and 0.70 and this signify that 
AUDO1 correlates positively with firm performance. The significance value is 0.56145 
which is higher than p<0.001. Therefore, H0 (There is no correlation between audit tenure 





4.4.1.2 Board Ownership 
In this study, it was also revealed that board ownership correlates positively with the 
performance of a firm. Pearson correlation value for this relationship were recorded at 
0.02431 which is higher than p<0.05. Hence, board characteristics is significantly 
correlated with firm performance. Therefore, H0 (There is no correlation between board 
ownership and performance) was not accepted while H2 was accepted.  
 
4.4.1.3 Board Sizes 
In this study, it was also revealed that board sizes correlates positively with the 
performance of a firm. Pearson correlation value for this relationship were recorded at 
0.06276 which is higher than p<0.001. Hence, board characteristics is significantly 
correlated with firm performance. Therefore, H0 (There is no correlation between board 
sizes and performance) was not accepted while H3 was accepted. 
 
4.4.1.4 CEO Duality 
In this study, it was also revealed that CEO Duality correlates positively with the 
performance of a firm. Pearson correlation value for this relationship were recorded at 
0.09332. Hence, CEO Duality is significantly correlated with firm performance. As such, 
H0 (There is no correlation between CEO Duality and firm performance) was not accepted 




4.4.2 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Table 4.4: 
Model Summary of Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 Model Summary  
Root MSE Dependent Mean Coefficient Variance R-Square Adjusted R- 
Square 
3.65874 10.74980 34.03540 0.5135 0.4930 
a. Predictors: (Constant), AUDQ, BCHAR 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
 
The table above represent the value of R square (R²) in model summary. It was referred 
to as a coefficient to determine value. The value of R² was recorded at 0.5135 and signified 
a variance level of 51.35% amongst firm performance which is the dependent variable in 
the study. Casually, the results mean that independent variable involved in this study 
which is audit quality and board characteristics can predict firm performance through 
value of ROE. Also, the percentage of remaining variance which is 48.65% was 
determined by other variables or factors which is not included in the study. Meanwhile, 
the adjusted R² refer to the value which were deemed as reliable in ROE determination. 
In order to explain variable explanation and its impact against performance of a firm, 
several conjecturers in terms of variables will be utilized in the model summary. To make 






Table 4.5:  
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean 
Squares 
F Value Pr> F 
Model 4 1342.43260 335.60815 25.07 <.0001 
Error 95 1271.70420 13.38936   
Corrected Total 99 2614.13680    
a. Predictors: (Constant), AUDQ, BCHAR 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
 
In Table 4.5, analysis of variance was shown. It was found that the level of p-value 
(0.0001) is lower than 0.001 which means that the model summary in the study is 
significant in terms of statistical analysis and is acceptable in relation to the outcome. The 
value of F is 25.07 and the significant table is 0.001 (Weiers, 2010) while the level of 
numerator freedom recorded at 4 and denominator freedom level recorded at 95. In 
general, the variables in the study can be used to determine firm performance through 









Table 4.6:  
Parameter Estimates 
MODEL Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized 
Coefficient 
  
 β Std. Error Beta t-
value 
Sig. 
(Constant) 12.80023 4.28196 0 -2.99 0.0036 
AUDQ1 15.01703*** 3.64943 0.33632 4.11 <.0001 
BCHAR1 0.09542* 0.05123 0.13745 1.86 0.0642 
BCHAR2 0.17541* 0.04122 0.31244 4.27 0.0621 
BCHAR3 0.00521 0.02012 0.01933 0.25 0.8001 
 
Where, *** = p <0.0001 
    ** = p < 0.05  
                 * = p < 0.10  
a. Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (ROE) 
 
4.4.3 Unstandardized Coefficients 
In order to find out the influence of independent variable towards dependent variable, 
unstandardized coefficients (β) were employed through developing a regression equation. 
The results generated in Table 4.6 has contributed to the development of the regression as 
below. 








Measurement for each Variables 
 
H1 expects a positive and significant relationship between Audit Tenure ROE. It was 
aligned with the outcomes showed in Table 4.6 whereby AUDQ1 was found to have a 
significant effect to ROE, as the p-value located at less than 0.0001, which is lower than 
0.05. Meanwhile, AUDQ1 with highest positive beta weight (β=15.01703) indicates a 
positive relationship. 
 
H2 anticipates a positive and significant relationship between Board Ownership and ROE. 
It was aligned with the outcomes showed in Table 4.6 whereby BCHAR1 was found to 
have a significant effect to ROE, as the p-value located at 0.0642, which is lower than 
Variables Definition Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Return On Equity ROE Net Income/ Shareholder Equity 
Independent Variables 
Board Ownership BCHAR1 Ratio of shares held by director 
divided by total outstanding 
shares 
Board Sizes BCHAR2 Number of inside and outside 
directors on the board 
CEO Duality BCHAR3 Coded “1” if Chairman also 
holds the position of CEO and 
“0” otherwise 
Audit Tenure AUDQ1 Number of years of for auditor. 
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0.10. Meanwhile, BCHAR1 with positive beta weight (β=0.09542) indicates a positive 
relationship.  
 
H3 showed a positive and significant relationship between Board Sizes and ROE. It was 
aligned with the outcomes showed in Table 4.6 whereby BCHAR2 was found to have a 
significant effect to ROE, as the p-value located at 0.0621, which is lower than 0.10. 
Meanwhile, BCHAR2 with positive beta weight (β=0.17541) indicates a positive 
relationship. 
 
H4 predicts a positive and significant relationship between CEO Duality and ROE. It was 
aligned with the outcomes showed in Table 4.6 whereby BCHAR3 was found no effect to 
ROE, as the p-value located at 0.8001, which is more than 0.05. Meanwhile, BCHAR3 
with positive beta weight (β=0.00521) indicates a positive relationship.  
 
4.4.2 Standardized Coefficients  
Standardized coefficients were used in this study to identify the contribution of each 
variable in relation to the conceptual model. The larger beta of independent variable will 
lead to a remarkable change on dependent variable. According to Table 4.6 showed that 
the standardized coefficients (β) of all independent variable. The independent variable that 
showed the highest β value is AUDQ1 (0.33632), continued with BCHAR2 (0.13745), 
BCHAR1 (0.13745) as well as BCHAR3 (0.01933) 
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4.5 Summary of Statistical Analysis 
4.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
This study investigates a total of 77 companies for which were dispersed in different 
sectors. All of the companies were listed in Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange. Previously, 
Table 4.2 shows the summary of overall descriptive statistics which involves the mean 
and standard deviation value of audit quality, board characteristics and firm performance. 
The data of each companies’ financial report was retrieved from Bursa Malaysia Stock 
Exchange official website. Dataset was limited to a period of 5 years starting from 2014 
until 2015.  
 
4.5.2 Inferential Analysis 
4.5.2.1 Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.8:  





















































0.00521 Slight but 
negligible 





While the correlation between variables in this study was measured by Pearson correlation 
analysis. Independent variable includes AUDQ and BCHAR while dependent variable is 
ROE (performance of a firm). In summary, AUDQ1, BCHAR1 and BCHAR2 
independent variables moderately correlate with the performance of the firm in this study 
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with r value of 0.56145, 0.02431 and 0.06276. In addition, BCHAR3 was found have a 
insignificant relationship with ROE.  
 
4.6 Discussion of Major Findings 
4.6.1 Relationship between Audit Quality and Firm Performance 
As for the first hypothesis testing (H1), there was significant relationship between audit 
quality and firm performance and that H1 was accepted, HO was rejected. The result 
indicates that audit quality with a degree of autonomy subsequently impact on how firms 
report on their financial data. The significant level is less than 0.001. The findings were 
supported by Jackson et al., (2007) states that the audit tenure can provide auditor firm a 
better understanding of his clients, thus increasing audit quality.  
 
This will in turn help the company to portray a good governance image which boost the 
confidence among current and potential investors. Mamun et al., (2014) also in agreement 
with the findings of this study. Their study found that audit committee who are not 
influenced by external or internal forces will subsequently affect how the company report 
its data and furthermore can help in reducing mistakes in account-related facts and figures. 
Moreover, a study by Wang and Huynh in 2013 also revealed that independent audit board 
have some significance in firm’s investment ratio. In this sense, it was believed that 
independent audit committee is responsible in maintaining company honesty in data 
reporting especially related to their financial situation. 
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4.6.2 Relationship between Board Characteristics and Firm Performance 
The findings for this hypothesis showed that there was a significant relationship between 
board ownership and board sizes with company performance. The value of p recorded is 
less than 0.001 which means that H2 and H3 was accepted and HO was rejected. 
Meanwhile, for relationship between CEO Duality with company performance, the value 
of p recorded is more than 0.001. Which means that H4 was rejected and H0 was accepted.  
The findings of this study is in line with majority of the previous studies which note that 
there was a significant relationship between board characteristics and firm performance. 
For example, the study by Amer et al., (2014) which found that the size of the board 
committee plays an important role in the performance of a firm. The study by Azim 92012) 
and Al-Rasas and Kamardin in 2015 also corroborate with this study. They state that board 
members are responsible in influencing audit quality in the sense that their position is 
directly associated with companies’ performance. The large number of board members 
will either help audit committee to complete audit process faster and improve efficiency 
or either influenced in the auditing process in the sense of tampered audit outcomes 
Also, Matari et al., (2012) noted that larger board members mean high authority provision 
and wider knowledge base to assist audit committee in completing the audit process. The 
findings by Chandrasegaram et al., (2013) however contradict with the findings of this 
study. They further added, the number of the board members do not significantly relate 
with how the company perform in a given time. They also questioned the assistance given 
by board members in helping audit committee to perform their intended tasks. In addition, 
board members with high knowledge and skills are unlikely to provide a helping hand to 
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especially external audit members and thus, does not correlate with monitoring and 
evaluation process of a company’s performance.  
  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the findings and discussion of the results. The data was organized 
into tables to better accommodate understanding of readers. The research found that audit 
quality and board characteristics plays significant role in determining companies’ 
performance.  The p-value recorded for both independent variables was well under 0.0001 
mark. The following Chapter 5 is the last chapter in this study which includes implications, 














CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses on several subsections which includes study implications, 
limitations and also recommendations for this study was also outlined in this chapter. 
Implications in this study were divided into two subthemes which is theoretical and 
managerial implications. Recommendation made was a string of suggestions on how to 
improve current research and provide insights to how future researchers who wanted to 
investigate the same topic would benefit from this thesis. 
 
5.2 Implications of Study 
5.2.1 Practical Implication 
The study meant to assess the effect audit quality and board characteristics has to the firm 
performance of the recorded organizations. The findings showed that there is a 
relationship between audit quality and board characteristics which subsequently impact 
on how company perform. The findings of the study possess significant role towards the 
betterment of managerial role. For example, a company which are aware with how audit 
quality impact on overall performance will subsequently assist them in hiring reliable 
internal or external audit service to bring about sound financial report and better public 
image. Hence, management body of a company will be able to cater the needs of public 
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demand for transparent financial reporting and also stakeholders’ interest in making sure 
that company’s image maintains good.  
 
Further, in order to comprehend the basic impacts of audit quality and board 
characteristics to firm performance, the management will need to fork out bigger costs to 
cover the effects caused by inaccurate audit report. This could be in terms of tarnished 
image, sales plunge and also overridden debt due to investors pulling out from investing 
in the company. Hence, management need to be vigilant and are responsible in providing 
an environment which is not susceptible to fraud and other company wrongdoings, 
because if it was exposed in the audit report, the company will suffer bad consequences 
in general to their profit rate and performance. Other than that, the finding of this study 
encourage the company to practice good audit board members’ selection process as to 
ensure that the hired auditors have the capacity to work together with the company without 
being subjected to company’s board members’ authority in providing a good and partial 
financial report.  
 
In this sense, the management is responsible in making sure that the company outsource 
good external or internal audit members and to ensure board members have little to or no 
control over the autonomy of audit committee. Thus, the findings of this study is important 
to managerial functions and duties to preserve good financial report practice and maintain 




5.2.2 Theoretical Implications 
Studying firm performance is a challenging task because it involves many internal and 
external factors. The validity of the financial data depends on the subject itself. If a data 
was extracted from the company site, validity is one of the measure to determine whether 
the facts and figures tally with the current performance of the company. Since there may 
not be an ideal method of measurement or determination of firm performance, researcher 
have used a method that is considered the best that can be done according to the time and 
purpose of the study. For business and financial researchers, this kind of study is an update 
to many studies that have been carried out in the past especially in the context of Malaysia. 
Theoretically, this study contributes to how firm performance is impacted by audit quality 
and board characteristics which is among the factors influencing companies’ decision and 
process. 
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
A few limitations which may impacted the understanding of discoveries in the exploration 
ought to be underscored. It is critical to distinguish the impediments that oblige the 
investigation with the goal that future scientists ready to utilize the restrictions as a chance 
to depict the requirement for future research. To begin with, this study is just to focus on 
board characteristics and audit quality as affected factors and their effects to companies’ 
financial performance in Malaysia. Consequently, there are just constrained quantities of 
past examinations that completed in Malaysia to be utilized as reference. Accordingly, 
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this may influence the academic writing and the examination of research issue into this 
topic.  
 
Aside from that, this study was hypothetically developed based on null hypothesis in 
connection to audit quality, board characteristics and firm performance. In this way, the 
research was limited on focusing on only board characteristics and audit quality without 
taking thought on other related factors, for example, audit members. Aside from that, the 
researcher experiences a limitation in terms of time constraint. Since the project was 
expected to be completed within a timeframe, with careful efforts taken in terms of time 
management, the researcher was able to overcome the time constraints and conclude the 
project successfully.  
 
5.4 Recommendation of the Study 
Given that this study has its own limitations, several further studies are suggested. Further 
studies in the performance are needed to help identify the elements that help make the 
practice of sound audit review and board involvement more comprehensive and 
systematic. This study was conducted in involving only listed companies in Malaysia. It 
is recommended that a further study be conducted focuses on the process of audit and the 
extent of board involvement in audit process including selected board members and 
auditors of the company. The findings can be compared between company performances 
in different sectors constructs. In addition, this study should be conducted in settings other 
than business sectors. These may include the hospitals, schools and more because it also 
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a part of economic institution. In Malaysia several initiatives and major development has 
been taken by the government to strengthen the board structure and composition in order 
to create good dynamics of board meetings discussion which will lead to better firm 
performance and create good value creation to shareholders and the firm itself. Future 
research could also explore on board characteristics and firm performance by using 
different research method and other approach. Semi structured interviews with board 
members will provide further insights and information on the effects of board 
characteristics and firm performance. 
  
5.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the study has successfully determined the relationship between audit quality 
and board characteristics with firm performance. The findings proved that firms in 
Malaysia were affected by how well the audit outcome and the elements in board 
characteristics in determining their overall business achievements and success. 
Implications of this study in terms of managerial perspective is that it can serve as a 
guideline for company management to take audit quality seriously. This includes to make 
sure that the board members do not directly intervene with the auditing process in the 
sense that it can tamper the outcome of the audit process.  
 
This is not only beneficial in terms of company image, but also useful as a tool to attract 
potential investors due to reliable and sound audit records reflecting company past and 
current performances. In terms of theoretical aspect, this study provides a benchmark for 
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future study intends to dive into the same topic circulating Malaysian business setting. 
Also, the researcher outlined several limitations faced in completing this study which was 
eventually resolved. However, future researchers were advised to take a different 
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